Risk assessments are necessary to anticipate and prevent accidents from occurring or repeating. This paper focuses specifically on the relationship between function and risk by presenting a mathematical mapping from product function to risk likelihood. This type of mapping will aid designers by removing the subjectivity of the likelihood value from a risk element, provide three key risk element properties (design parameter, failure mode, and likelihood) for numerous risk elements with one simple mathematical calculation, and provide a means for inexperienced designers to effectively address risk in the conceptual design phase. In addition, the level of detail a functional model should be written in to produce adequate likelihood risk assessments is examined.
INTRODUCTION
To prevent accidents from repeating, engineers have often use failure analysis tools; while this often leads to advances in technology, failure analysis is not a stand-alone tool. A risk assessment is also necessary to anticipate and prevent accidents from occurring or repeating.
This type of assessment involves the estimation or calculation of both the likelihood of potential failures and their consequences. The results of combining effective failure analysis and risk assessment tools include the safety, reliability, and security of products. [1] . The chances of a risk event occurring are greatest in the conceptual, planning, and startup phases of a project. The cost impact of a risk event in the project is less if the event occurs earlier rather than later. The early stages of the project represent the period when the opportunity for minimizing the impact or working around a potential risk exists (see Figure 1 .)
Risk is the chance that an undesirable event will occur and the consequences of all its possible outcomes

Figure 1: Risk and Cost for Project Life Cycle
Since the opportunity for minimizing project risks occurs in the conceptual design phase a tool that utilizes failure analysis to estimate project risk in this design phase would be beneficial.
The current state-of-the-art in quantitative risk analysis is Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [2] . PRA is a systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate the risk associated with every life-cycle aspect of a system in which the risk is assessed in quantitative terms. This type of assessment requires answering the following questions: 1) What are the initiating events that lead to adverse consequences?
2) How severe are these adverse consequences? 3) How likely do these adverse consequences occur?
Some of the existing methodologies for answering each of the questions are as follows: Combining these methods can create a complete PRA-based risk model; however, to be valid, such a model requires very detailed information and analyses, limiting the applicability of PRA during conceptual design [2] .
To meet the need for a PRA that can be performed during the conceptual design phase, it is proposed to extend the function failure design method to link product function to failure and then to preliminary risk assessments [10, 11, 15] . This will involve first, determining a mapping from product failure to risk assessment (see Figure 2 ) and, finally, examining which level of functional modeling is necessary to perform the assessment (see Figure 3 ).
BACKGROUND
Risk assessment is a key component throughout the lifecycle of a product. The introduction of risk assessment in the conceptual design phase is gaining popularity due to its potential to prevent failure and reduce cost. For example, a risk expert has been added to Team X, a NASA JPL based expert team used to produce conceptual design of space missions. The mission designs produced by Team X are generated in a war room type setting that promotes constant interaction from all the experts on the team [3] . The current method the risk expert uses to assemble the risk entails soliciting risks from each subsystem chair (expert) in this setting and tracking them in a database [4, 5] .
The reliance on the other experts to begin a process of establishing risks can hinder the risk analysis process as the setting of the design process tends to be chaotic. Therefore, a tool that would present a preliminary set of mission risks would be useful to the design process by reducing the initial dependence of the risk chair on the other design team members.
Prior work has presented an evaluation of the risk elements produced by the Team X environment [6, 7] . The results of these statistical and linguistic analyses show that to communicate risks effectively, a designer needs to address the following risk element properties in the risk element statement: performance parameter, design parameter, noise parameter, failure modes, and failure scenario. Also in conjunction with the risk element statement, the following data is also useful: likelihood of individual failure modes, impact of individual failure modes, overall risk likelihood, overall risk impact, overall risk, mitigation, mitigated likelihood, and mitigated impact [6, 7] . As this is a large amount of data to extract from interviews, automation of some or all of the information would be useful.
Risk identification has seen much attention by various disciplines such as the Condition-Transition-Consequence (CTC) software engineering approach [8] as well as event tree approach and the fault tree approach [2] . While these methods vary slightly in their approaches they all have one element in common. An expert is required to create the risk from their experience. Therefore, the individual (or team) responsible for the risk analysis must have the knowledge of all past and potential failures.
A drive toward automatic generation of risks based on a product's functions has been the focus of research efforts. Currently, the Function-Failure Design Method (FFDM), a mathematical relationship between product function and failure modes, is a significant step in that direction [9, 10, 11] . This relationship is dependent on the specific languages used to describe both function and failure (the functional basis [12] and failure mode taxonomy [13] , respectively) and the knowledge base that contains the data from which the FFDM draws its information.
The current FFDM method provides a starting point for determining the likelihood of product failure by a particular function. This method generates a matrix which matches function to product component (EC), and one which links product component with failure modes (CF) to output the number of failures that have occurred for a particular function in the form of the EF matrix (see The knowledge base used for the FFDM calculations is stored in Design Repository at the University of Missouri-Rolla. This design tool was produced for storing a wide variety of product design information such as component functionality, material description, and manufacturing choice. This design repository serves as a platform from which to add additional features for addressing failure and risk data for assisting conceptual design tasks [14] .
The FFDM knowledge base was initialized with failure data on the Bell 206 rotorcraft. NTSB accident reports, maintenance manuals, and engineering judgment were used to populate the rotorcraft's functional model, functioncomponent matrix, and function-failure matrix [11] . Spacecraft systems such as a spacecraft orientation subsystem and a subsystem used to guide science instruments have also been added to the database [15] . This paper focuses on extending the FFDM mathematical mapping to the likelihood property of a risk element. This mathematical mapping is based on occurrences of past failures; therefore, the subjectivity usually associated with the risk element numerical likelihood value is removed.
MOTIVATION
Since risk information is important to achieve successful products, it is vital that risk information is communicated accurately and effectively early in the design process. Various processes such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Process Hazard Analysis are used in industry to elicit risks and provide a standard framework on which discussion of risk can take place. However, these tools lack a unified language and are difficult to perform before the product exists in a physical form (i.e., during the conceptual design phase). These factors lead to the need for a tool to allow designers to describe a risk in terms of likelihood and consequence regarding a particular failure event during early design stages when physical solutions have not yet been selected and the design is described mainly in functional terms.
OBJECTIVES
The core goal of this work is to construct a practical and mathematically based theory for performing a risk assessment during a product's conceptual design phase. This paper addresses this goal by presenting a function to risk likelihood mapping. The mapping involves using a knowledge base of past failures to mathematically produce a risk assessment of a product before it is physically realized. The mapping links the product function directly to the likelihood on a risk fever chart as shown in Figure 3 . This type of mapping will aid designers by removing the subjectivity of the likelihood value from a risk element, provide three key risk element properties (design parameter, failure mode, and likelihood) for numerous risk elements with one simple mathematical calculation, and provide a means for inexperienced designers to effectively address risk in the conceptual design phase. 
SCOPE
There exist many components to risks such as various risk attributes [8] and risk element properties [6] . Also, there exists a quantitative definition of risk that consists of a set of triplets <s i , p i , x i >, where s i is the scenario, p i is the probability, and xi is the consequence [17] . The scope of this paper is limited to mapping product function to likelihood of physical failure modes. Therefore, this paper only addresses the design parameter, failure mode, and likelihood of individual failure mode risk elements [6] which relate to the risk attributes of context and risk exposure (impact) [8] and also the scenario and probability components of the risk triplet.
APPROACH
The approach to this work includes proposing a function to risk likelihood mapping, implementing this mapping on known product failures, and using the knowledge gained from the aggregate failures to perform an initial validation case study.
The function to risk likelihood mapping is an extension of the FFDM. The FFDM produces the number of failures that have occurred for a particular function. This result is a matrix multiplication of the mxr binary function-component matrix (EC) and the rxn component-failure matrix (CF). The resulting function-failure matrix (EF) is of size mxn, and contains the numerical relationship between particular functions and the frequency of their failure occurrences, as shown in Equation (1):
There are two cases of EF matrices, EF product and EF aggregate . EF product refers to the matrix obtained by Equation (1) where the elements of the EC (function-component) matrix are limited to only the functions of the particular product being examined. EF aggregate refers also to a matrix obtained by Equation (1); however, the elements of the EC in this case are all possible function-component combinations contained in a database. Therefore, EF product lists only function-failure pairings that are relevant to a particular product while EF aggregate lists all known function-failure pairings in a database. The remaining calculations of this paper will imply the use of EF product by the notation EF. The resultant values will calculate the likelihood of a risk element occurring relative to that particular product.
The function-likelihood mapping assigns a likelihood value, l ij , to the individual elements of the EF matrix, ef ij , where i and j represent the row and column location of the individual element of the EF matrix. This likelihood value corresponds to the likelihood values of a risk fever chart. The mathematical formula for the likelihood, l, of the ijth element of the likelihood matrix, L, is shown in Equation (2).
This equation maps each element of the EF matrix to an integer value that can be used on the standard risk fever charts. This likelihood value represents the likelihood of function failures in a particular product from 5, the highest probability of failure in the product, to 0, no past reported failures for the function.
This mapping assigns a likelihood of failure that is relative to the function-failure data for an individual product. This relative assignment indicates to designers the order of the likelihood of failure of the functions in their product. This also prevents some dependence on the status of the knowledge base. For example, if a particular type of function-failure has an unusually high number of reports in the knowledge base and is not related to the product at hand, this inconsistency will not affect the risk analysis of the product.
The risk likelihood matrix, L, is calculated for a spacecraft orientation subsystem, a subsystem used to guide science experiments on an extraterrestrial rover, and Bell 206 rotorcraft to augment the function-failure studies performed on these products.
RESULTS
In previous work, two subsystems from a NASA unmanned space mission were investigated in an effort to extend the FFDM to the conceptual design stage to electrical systems [16] . The subsystems were a spacecraft orientation subsystem and subsystem for maneuvering science instruments. Also the Bell 206 rotorcraft NTSB reports were used to initially test the FFDM and provided initial mechanical failures. These products are used in this paper to perform a validation case study for the function to risk likelihood mapping. Specifically, a likelihood risk assessment was performed on these three case studies. The likelihood assessment produces portions of risk elements for a designer to use during the conceptual design phase to get an idea of potential areas of concern.
Information from functional models were used to create a function component (EC) matrix for both the primary (EC pri ) and secondary (EC sec ) function levels, from the functional basis, for each product that was studied. The componentfailure (CF) matrix containing instances of actual failures was constructed using past failures of various products. Using Equation (1), a function-failure matrix (EF) was constructed for both the primary and secondary function levels of each product. The resulting primary and secondary function-failure matrices were EF pri and EF sec , respectively.
The risk likelihood value of a function of the spacecraft orientation subsystem experiencing a particular failure was calculated using Equation 2, where EF is EF product pri for the primary function level likelihood calculation and, similarly, EF is EF product sec for the secondary function level likelihood calculation. The resulting likelihood matrices are L pri and L sec . The elements of the matrices with value greater than zero are considered product risks. Each risk likelihood value and its corresponding column and row heading were combined to form a risk element.
This method produces statements of risk which denote design parameters (function) and failure modes. Further, the risk statement is augmented with a likelihood of that combination occurring relative to the other function-failure combinations for the product. An example risk element might be as follows:
Channel energy fails due to Galling, 3
In this example, channel energy represents the design parameter property of the risk element, galling represents the failure mode property of the risk element, and 3 represents the calculated likelihood value of the risk element.
The results presented in the following sections include the description of the product that the likelihood risk assessment is performed on, and the likelihood assessments for both the primary and secondary detail levels of the functional models.
The risk results are plotted on a vertical segment of a risk fever chart similar to the one used in the Team X Risk Analysis Prototype (RAP) [4] . The color code in the figure is based on an assumed consequence value of 3. This consequence value was chosen to provide an example of the likelihood data when plotted vertically on a risk fever chart. In practice, once the risk has been identified and assigned a likelihood value with the function to risk mapping in this paper, a consequence value must be determined before plotting the risk on a risk fever chart. 
Case Study 1: Spacecraft Orientation Subsystem
The first example is a spacecraft orientation subsystem, which is mounted on the spinning portion of the spacecraft and uses two slits to detect incoming starlight from which a signal pulse was generated. Each signal pulse is sent to the attitude control computer which uses the separation in time of the starlight signal pulses to determine the location of the spacecraft based on a catalog of star information [15, 17] .
Several sources (e.g., subsystem block diagram, schematic, parts list, electrical interface diagrams, and photographs) were combined and used to create the black box model, primary, and secondary functional models for the spacecraft orientation subsystem, shown in Figures 6, 7 , and 8 respectively [15] . These functional models combined with the failures that occurred prior to launch during assembly and testing [18] were used to generate the function-failure mapping for the spacecraft orientation subsystem. The risk likelihood result for the primary level functional model is shown in Figure 9 . There were 14 risks for the primary functional model which included 3 highly likely risks, 3 moderately likely risks, and 8 less likely risks (the color code in the figure is based on an assumed consequence value of 3 from a risk fever chart). The three most likely functions to experience a failure are control magnitude of energy, control magnitude of signal, and convert energy to energy which all have previously failed due to electrostatic discharge. Figure 10 depicts the risk likelihood for the spacecraft orientation subsystem secondary level functional model. As the functional descriptions become more specific and increase in number, the number of risk elements also increases. Here the secondary level risk likelihood shows 9 more risk elements than the primary level.
Figure 10: Spacecraft Orientation Subsystem Secondary Function Risks
The difference in likelihood values is a direct result of the level differences of the functional model. For example, in the primary function risks there is a risk element control magnitude of energy fails due to electrostatic discharge with the maximum likelihood value of 5. However, the 2 maximum likelihood risks of the secondary level analysis do not relate to this particular primary risk element. Upon examining the two levels more closely, the secondary risks associated with the primary risk are as follows:
 Actuate electrical energy fails due to electrostatic discharge, 2  Change electrical energy fails due to electrostatic discharge, 3  Regulate electrical energy fails due to electrostatic discharge, 3 The failures associated with each separate function were not numerous enough alone to merit the maximum likelihood value, however, when combined together in the form of the primary function level of control magnitude of energy, the failures of all the 3 secondary functions are accumulated into this broader heading. Therefore, in this case, the primary functional level has a higher risk likelihood value. This means that with less detailed information about product function this method produced a more conservative risk assessment. When examining the secondary risk likelihood assessment, as more specific forms for this function were determined, a more specific failure combination was examined. This provided a breakdown of the components of the primary likelihood risk element of control magnitude of energy due to electrostatic discharge. This is a particular example of how the number of risk elements can increase from the primary to secondary level and how the likelihood value of a risk element can decrease from the primary value.
Case Study 2: Subsystem for Maneuvering Science Instruments
Next, an unmanned spacecraft subsystem that was used to guide science instruments and collect data is analyzed as a validation study for the function likelihood risk mapping. Information available to the public [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] was used to construct black box model for the subsystem [15] , shown in Figure 11 , as well as the primary and secondary level functional models to be used in the function to risk likelihood mapping. The risk elements from the function to risk likelihood mapping of the primary level functional model of the subsystem used to guide science instruments are displayed in Figure 12 . This figure shows the 25 risk elements of the primary level functional model and their corresponding likelihood values. This mapping produced 2 high level risks, channel energy fails due to cracking and support material fails due to ductile rupture. Also, the figure shows the 23 moderate level risks which include channel energy fails due to undercurrent and signal material fails due to brittle fracture.
Electrical Energy
Figure 12: Subsystem Used to Guide Science Instruments Primary Function Risks
The result of the secondary level function to risk likelihood mapping of the subsystem used to guide science instruments is shown in Figure 13 . Transfer electrical energy fails due to cracking, 3 As in the previous case, the failures associated with each separate function were not numerous enough alone to merit the maximum likelihood value, however, when combined together in the form of the primary function level of control magnitude of energy, the failures of all the 4 secondary functions are accumulated into this larger heading. Therefore the primary functional level has a higher risk likelihood value, and, as in the previous case, this increases the number of risk elements.
Case Study 3: Bell 206 Rotorcraft Subsystems
The final case study to validate the proposed methodology is a set of subsystems for the Bell 206 rotorcraft, which includes the airframe, fuel system, rotor system in addition to the four systems that were investigated by Roberts et al. (compressor, turbine, engine, and power train) [26] . Various rotorcraft maintenance manuals and engineering judgment were used to derive functional models of each component, arriving at a primary and secondary level of functional models for the entire rotorcraft.
The function-risk likelihood mapping as described previously was performed on the Bell 206 rotorcraft functional models. The result of the primary function to risk likelihood mapping is displayed in Figure 14 . The 67 risk elements include 6 highly probable risks, 4 moderately probable risks, and 57 less probable risks. One of the most probable risk elements is support material fails due to high cycle fatigue (5), while a risk element that is less probable is provision energy fails due to yielding (2).
Figure 14: Bell 206 Rotorcraft Primary Function Risks
The 207 secondary level risk likelihood elements for the Bell 206 rotorcraft are shown in Figure 15 . The assessment consists of 7 highly probable risks, 7 moderately probable risks, and 107 less probable risks.  Import solid fails due to high cycle fatigue, 5 This is due to the likelihood value being relative the maximum failures experienced by a function for the product. As the functions change from primary to secondary, the number of failures experience by a primary function is not necessarily equal to the number of failures experienced by a secondary function. Therefore, the relative likelihood of related risks from the primary and secondary levels may or may not be the same.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper focused on the relationship between function and risk by presenting a mathematical mapping from product function to risk likelihood. This risk information is composed of design parameters, failure modes, and likelihood values. Several products were used to validate the mapping: 1) a spacecraft orientation subsystem; 2) a subsystem used to guide science instruments, and, 3) a Bell 206 rotorcraft. Future work on the function-risk relationship includes extending the automatic risk element generation from design parameter only, failure mode, and likelihood risk properties to include consequence risk properties. This type of mapping would provide both experienced and inexperience designers a solid first step in conducting a thorough risk assessment. To demonstrate the value of using this approach, the proposed function to risk mapping will be used to help generate failure 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  channel material  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  connect material  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
